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Abstract
In littoral warfare against a competent adversary, affordable levels of stealth and defensive weapons
will not prevent our warships from being hit by antiship weapons. As our ships will be hit, we must
design them to absorb these hits and continue to fight. In this paper, we consider the future threat and
four approaches to design for survivability: stealth, defensive weapons, passive defensive design, and
increased numbers. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are discussed. Only a bal-
anced strategy that incorporates the elements of all four approaches is likely to be both survivable
and affordable.
Introduction
For the last few decades, we have been designing
and building warships based on a design philos-
ophy that evolved during the era of theMaritime
Strategy (Palmer 1996; Watkins 1986; Brooks
1986). Under this strategy, the major threats to
warships would come from submarine-launched
cruise missiles or torpedoes, cruise missile
attacks frommassed elements of the Soviet Fleet,
and/or cruise missile attacks by division-sized
bomber elements of Soviet Naval Aviation. Any
and all engagements involving our Navy would
be blue water actions (in open oceans off of the
continental shelves). The maximum credible
attack consisted of perhaps a dozen torpedoes
targeted against a limited number of ships (usu-
ally the aircraft carrier and its immediate escort)
or roughly 100–200 cruise missiles targeted
against a carrier battle group.
Defense against the submarine threat consisted
of semi-independent patrol by one or two nu-
clear attack submarines, screening by several
destroyers (carrying hull-mounted, towed, and
helicopter-borne sonar systems and antisubma-
rine torpedo weapons), and self-defense
antitorpedo decoys (e.g., Nixie). Defense against
the cruise missile threat involved multiple layers.
Carrier-based aviation would engage the surface
fleet or bomber forces before those forces could
launch their missiles. Shooting the ‘‘archer’’ was
preferable to shooting down the ‘‘arrows.’’
Invariably, a sizeable number of ‘‘archers’’ would
survive the air attack or be able to fire their
‘‘arrows’’ before being shot down. A few dozen
missiles would remain for the next layers of
defense. Any remaining available carrier aircraft
would attempt to shoot down in flight any mis-
siles they could. Standard missiles (SM-2) would
engage the cruise missiles as soon as the AEGIS
system (or its Cooperative Engagement Capabil-
ity upgrade) could detect and track them. At
shorter ranges, Sea Sparrow or Rolling Airframe
Missiles (RAM) would engage those cruise mis-
siles surviving the SM-2 layer. At minimum
range, the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System
(CIWS) would lay down a barrage of bullets at
any target surviving the Sea Sparrow or RAM
attacks. All of the preceding layers would be
backstopped by SLQ-32 electronic warfare
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systems and a variety of chaff and infrared
decoys. Furthermore, given the relatively inac-
curate targeting available to the enemy and the
modest performance of then-available missile
seekers, significant improvements in survivabil-
ity could be achieved by incorporation of as
much stealth (primarily radar cross-section
reduction) as practical into later warship designs.
This reduced the probability that a threat missile
could find and hit its target, even if it were not
successfully engaged by defensive weaponry.
Given the Cold War threats, analysis consis-
tently showed that only a few, if any, missiles or
torpedoes would survive to impact our warships.
Thus, it proved cost-effective to design our Mar-
itime Strategy combatants (basically the FF-7,
DD-963, DDG-51, CG-47, and CVN-68 classes)
to survive only one or two hits.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ended the
utility of the Maritime Strategy, but did not
eliminate the existence of threats. New threats
are emerging and these are driving the United
States Navy to develop new strategies. At the
present time, it seems certain that any overarch-
ing strategy will involve at least some conflict in
littoral waters (Office of the Chairman JCS
1996; Office of the Chairman JCS 1997). The
implication of naval conflict in littoral waters is
that naval combatants will come into the range
of far more numerous threats. Coastal patrol
craft, land-launched cruise missiles, ballistic
missiles, coastal patrol submarines (SSK),
moored and shallow-water bottom mines, short-
range land-based aviation, and even land-based
artillery (long-range ‘‘superguns’’ (Gilreath et al.
1999; Lowther 1991) must be contended with in
addition to the classical maritime strategy
threats. Furthermore, attacks may occur at re-
duced ranges and may involve weapons with
both improved targeting and more robust guid-
ance systems. Recent studies of the enemy area
denial problem (Mahnken 1998) have indicated
that negation of United States force projection
capabilities by a hostile state requires an ability
to keep the United States Navy out of that state’s
littoral waters. One of the unanimous conclu-
sions of these same studies was that the hostile
state could and should invest in large numbers
(many thousands) of antiship missiles, as well as
mines and submarines.
If a limited naval force (such as one or two car-
rier battle groups or less) enters the littoral
waters of an adversary, it can expect massive
missile attacks in numbers 3–10 times larger
than the maximum credible blue water threat. In
littoral waters, more of the threats will be land-
based or sea-based (small patrol craft) rather
than airborne. This makes it harder for long-
range aviation to target the archers before
launch, even if the evolving rules of engagement
permit such engagements. Shorter launch ranges
on the part of threat aircraft may prevent avia-
tion from destroying any missiles in flight. Thus,
a higher fraction of the much larger attack will
likely survive to confront the inner layers of the
defense. If we use an analysis similar to that per-
formed for the blue water threat (this analysis is
detailed in a later section), then each ship in a
littoral engagement can expect at least 8–10 hits
and possibly more than 15 hits. With current
ships, this would almost certainly mean com-
plete loss of combat function, if not sinking. This
suggests that our current naval force is not sur-
vivable in high-intensity littoral conflicts.
However, future combatant designs must be sur-
vivable in these environments if the United States
is to remain a dominant world power.
There are four competing strategies for survival
against massive attacks: design the ship to be
invisible to the threat (stealth), provide the ship
with sufficient defensive weapons to counter the
threat (active defense), design the ship to absorb
without unacceptable damage the punishment
the enemy can inflict (passive defense), or design
much smaller ships that can be built and
deployed in such large quantities that enough
will survive any attack (increased numbers of
minicombatants that are ‘‘expendable’’ in the
same way that individual infantry soldiers are
expendable). Survivability is generally consid-
ered to have two components: susceptibility (the
ability of the enemy to detect, localize, engage,
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and hit a target) and vulnerability (the degree to
which a hit can cause serious damage to the
target). An arguable third component—
recoverability—can be incorporated into vulner-
ability without loss of fidelity in the following
arguments. Stealth, active defense, and increased
numbers all address the susceptibility aspects of
survivability. Passive defense addresses the vul-
nerability aspects. In this article, we will
examine the ramifications of the following four
approaches, given the postulated future threat.
TheFutureThreat
In the following sections, we will examine the
impacts on warship design, given four different
approaches to handling a postulated threat. We
assume a threat that is not the standard threat
being used by current requirements setters.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, requirements
setters looked far and wide for new threats
against which to pit their new system develop-
ments. Unfortunately, they concentrated on the
near term and not the long term. In general, the
assumed naval threats tended to mirror or at best
slightly evolve from the existing capabilities of
known adversaries. The threats are basically
minor navies equipped with limited numbers of
first-line ex-Soviet combatants (possibly includ-
ing a number of submarines) equipped with
substantial but limited numbers of antiship
cruise missiles. It was expected that current ship
designs were sufficient to stand up to these short-
term threats. Little emphasis was placed on the
forces of countries considered as unlikely adver-
saries or on the reactions that adversaries might
take to counter (in the long term) our known
actions, i.e., our existing and planned forces and
equipment.
At the request of the Office of Naval Research
and the Executive Panel of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Naval Postgraduate School
undertook to develop a credible and fully justi-
fiable set of long-term (ca. 2020) threats (Melich
et al. 2000). Several teams of students were as-
sembled, each team representing a different
potential 2020 adversary to the United States.
Each team had four to five officer students
(drawn from each of the four military services
and more or less equally split between national
security and engineering studies) and one or two
faculty advisors (typically highly experienced in
the systems engineering, design, development,
and manufacture of large-scale defense systems).
Over the course of several months, each team
proceeded to develop their military force
structures in three successive 7-year epochs. In
each epoch, the team was given an estimate of
the military budget it would have available and a
national military strategy. The budget and
strategy were developed by outside teams of
expert consultants drawn from industry,
academia, and government. Wherever possible,
the consultant teams included nationally
recognized economic, political, and intelligence
experts on the countries being gamed. The
consultant groups were chartered to develop
strategies and budgets that represented the
groups’ best estimates as to the actual future
course of events. The only guidance given to
the groups was to assume less than benign
intentions on the part of the foreign
government and that the United States would
probably oppose any military expansion of
influence beyond the borders of that state.
Obviously, if a potential adversary decides on
peace, then there is no need for a military
response on the part of the United States. As we
were looking to define possible future adversary
characteristics, we forced each of the targeted
nations to be adversarial. However, no guidance
was given as to the nature that the adversarial
character should assume.
Given its country’s strategy and budget, the stu-
dent team was free to develop forces and
equipment consistent with that strategy and that
budget. Resources were allocated among
research & development (R&D), manpower,
procurement, operations, intelligence acquisi-
tion, and counterintelligence. All aspects of the
military (land, sea, air, and space) were consid-
ered in the allocations. Specific R&D programs
and specific equipment acquisitions were identi-
fied. Equipment acquisitions could only be made
from those items that had been allocated full
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R&D funds in prior epochs, or that were avail-
able on the international arms market. The
systems engineering faculty validated budget
estimates as to R&D cost, and unit equipment
costs for every hardware type based on their
extensive experience (typically 20 or more years
each in the defense industry). The input to the
first epoch was the best available intelligence on
current budgets, force structures, and defense
R&D investments. The outputs of the first epoch
were used by the consultant groups to define the
inputs to the second epoch and the outputs of the
second epoch were used to define the inputs to
the third epoch. In this manner, our knowledge
of that country in 1999 was projected in a bud-
get- and politics-constrained fashion out to the
2020 time frame.
This approach does not generate a probable
future, but does define a plausible and realistic
one. The results of this analysis are politically
sensitive, identifying enlightened forecasts of
what potential adversaries might do. To avoid
condemning nations for actions they have not
yet taken (and hopefully will never take), we will
not identify the specific countries or their spe-
cific responses. However, some responses
occurred for every country studied. This indi-
cates that a potential future threat will likely
have at least these elements in its future force
structure. We will describe only the maritime-
relevant responses.
In reading the threat description below, remem-
ber that the countries involved planned for
potential conflict with the United States at a time
roughly 20 years in the future. They reshaped
their militaries based on long-term strategies
that in turn considered the directions the US
military was taking. Being composed of capable
military officers, the country teams rightly
assumed that the best strategy was to concen-
trate on defeating United States weaknesses, not
to mirror United States capabilities. They had
two decades and 20 years of defense budgets in
which to accomplish their goals. The threat
description is not based on what they were doing
in 1999, but on what they could do if they
perceived that conflict with the United States
was inevitable.
Specifically, there was increased emphasis on
having a credible diesel submarine force. The
richest adversary nations (near peer competitors)
developed their own submarines in substantial
numbers; poorer adversary nations (regional
competitors) purchased relatively modern Soviet
or European submarines in modest numbers.
The submarines carried extremely capable, long-
range torpedoes, a substantial fraction of which
had wake-homing seekers.
Each country invested a sizeable (but balanced)
share of its defense budget in antiship missiles.
Even the poorest country studied bought thou-
sands of Exocet or Silkworm missiles and
reasonably mobile launching platforms without
straining its defense budget to the breaking point
or ignoring the formation of a well-rounded
military. The near peer competitor nation pur-
chased or developed tens of thousands of
modern missiles. The antiship missiles could be
launched from at least five different kinds of
platforms: long-range attack aircraft, littoral
patrol craft, blue water surface combatants
(corvette or larger), submarines, and mobile
land-based launchers. Launchers were pur-
chased in sufficient quantity to allow multiple
massive attacks (1,000 missiles per attack in
flight at one time) to be delivered nearly simul-
taneously at several different points anywhere in
the adversary’s region of operations. Seekers on
the missiles included a mix of relatively unso-
phisticated radar seekers (as available today)
and very sophisticated advanced radar, imaging
infrared, and multimode seekers (to be devel-
oped in the next 10–15 years).
Tens of thousands of missiles seem large, but it
should be remembered that highly capable anti-
ship missiles (e.g., Harpoon) cost roughly
US$500,000 each, while less capable but serious
threats might cost as little as US$100,000 each.
Thus, 10,000 missiles cost only US$5 billion
dollars or less, the price of a single aircraft car-
rier, and only 1% of the 2009 US defense budget.
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Furthermore, those 10,000 missiles would prob-
ably be acquired over 20 years, making the
annual expenditureoUS$250 million, a small
fraction of the defense budget of any nation that
could be considered a regional competitor. It
should also be noted that the United States does
not expect to face major naval threats in its lit-
toral waters, and so it has not acquired weapons
or shaped its forces to defeat such a threat, as our
adversaries are likely to do. Nevertheless, the
United States has roughly 6,000 Harpoon anti-
ship missiles, roughly 20,000 antiradiation
missiles (ARM), and 37,000 Maverick missiles
that could be targeted against ships, and huge
quantities of general-purpose aircraft bombs
that can be used against any target (Federation
of American Scientists 2009). Neither the ARM
nor the Maverick missiles are intended for anti-
ship use, and because of their smaller warheads,
are unlikely to sink a major combatant, but can
cause severe damage either to a ship or its com-
bat systems. A few hits might be sufficient to
render a warship incapable of fighting or
defending itself. As a consequence, any ship
must defend against ARMs and anti-armor
missiles just as if they were large ship-killer
missiles.
Each country invested heavily in naval mines.
These tended to be evenly divided between deep-
water CAPTOR-like mines, moored mines,
shallow-water bottom mines, and surf-zone
mines. Most mines were expected to possess
enough intelligence to permit targeting of spe-
cific ship classes, to make sweeping difficult, and
to permit mines to be remotely activated and/or
deactivated.
An additional output of this study was a detailed
vulnerability analysis of US forces with respect
to area denial. This unpublished analysis
matched almost one for one an independent
analysis conducted by the Defense Science Board
(1995). Missiles, mines, and submarines in large
numbers were near the top of each list of threats
to our naval forces. These three threat develop-
ments alone (there were others of lesser
importance), when fielded in large numbers, will
have major impacts on combatant ship surviv-
ability. Let us first examine the impact on ships
built using the stealth approach to survivability.
Design for Stealth
If a combatant ship cannot be detected by a mis-
sile or a torpedo seeker, it cannot be hit except by
luck. Stealth functions to reduce the detectability
of a ship to levels that are assumed to be accept-
ably low. For example, an active radar missile
seeker has the highest probability of acquiring a
target ship if it is capable of detecting that ship as
it rises above the seeker’s radar horizon. For sea-
skimming missiles, this corresponds to a range of
20–30km (depending on the height of the ship).
Assume that the missile was not aimed precisely
at the target at launch and that the seeker can
barely detect the target at this range (in practice,
real seekers can have longer detection ranges
against traditional targets). By reducing the
detection range by an order of magnitude, the
probability of acquisition of the ship target
could be reduced to 10% of its original value by
a direct reduction in the ocean area that could be
searched. Such a reduction in the detection range
can be achieved by a four order of magnitude
reduction in cross-section. This is the primary
mechanism by which stealth reduces the suscep-
tibility of a target.
There are three basic problems with design for
stealth. First, stealth is expensive. Every aspect
of exterior design must be meticulously con-
trolled and special materials must be used.
Second, stealth is difficult to maintain. Modifi-
cations to a ship’s exterior, corrosion or aging of
external materials, sloppy maintenance, failure
to properly close all external doors/hatches/pan-
els after opening for operations or maintenance,
failure to stow supplies, equipment, and tools,
and opening of doors and hatches for normal
operations can significantly increase the detect-
ability of a ship. Third, stealth is a moving
target. Acceptably low signature levels at one
time may not (and probably will not) remain
acceptably low in the future. Advances in
component technology, packaging, or signal
processing permit significant advances in
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detection capability for seekers of the same basic
type. Furthermore, stealth in one signature does
not imply stealth in other signatures. A ship
designed for a low radar cross-section may be
undetectable to a conventional scanning radar
seeker. However, if the seeker technology
changes to use synthetic aperture radar, the low
cross-section against one kind of radar may not
prevent detection at useful ranges by another.
Similarly, if a ship designer designs for a low
radar cross-section, his design may be detectable
by passive infrared seekers. If he also controls
the infrared signature, the ship may be detect-
able by laser radar seekers, and so on.
Improvements in targeting can also negate the
benefits derived from stealth. Reducing the
detection range by an order of magnitude has no
effect on detection probability if the missile is
directed to the target so accurately that the mis-
sile always finds the target within its reduced
detection range.
It is not difficult to redesign a conventional tar-
get to achieve a significant reduction in
signature. It is very difficult to reduce the signa-
ture to truly undetectable levels. Even the B-2
stealth bomber is not undetectable: an ABM-
quality phased-array radar operating at mega-
watt average power levels would be capable of
detecting the B-2 at ranges capable of allowing
intercepts. However, in most cases, it would not
be cost-effective to deploy such radars against
the limited B-2 threat. Furthermore, making the
B-2 invisible to conventional air defense radars
increased the cost to such high levels that we
could not afford to buy more than a handful. At
last count, we had procured a total of 21 aircraft
at an average cost of US$2.1 billion each (Gov-
ernment Accounting Office 1997). The same fate
is befalling the F-22.
To design ships that will be undetectable by
advanced seekers of the 2020 era (or worse the
2050 era, when ships designed today will still be
required to operate) will almost certainly be
prohibitively costly. Unless we can afford to
build several new surface combatants each year,
we will suffer a continual decline in the size of
the Navy, and our ability to conduct the kinds of
operations we currently conduct will be ham-
pered by sheer lack of ships. Given the current
surface combatant ship construction budget
allocations, several ships per year can only be
achieved if the individual ship cost is much
o1 billion dollars. By comparison with the B-2
costs, it seems exceedingly doubtful that these
subbillion dollar ships can be designed to be
truly invisible to even one class of seekers, let
alone several. The more signature elements that
must be controlled, the more expensive will be
the resulting design. This does not mean that all
signature reduction is not worthwhile. The first
few order of magnitude reductions will be rela-
tively inexpensive and may eliminate the threat
from thousands of existing low-technology
seekers (such as simple active radar seekers or
reticle-based infrared seekers). However, it is not
sensible to base survivability in the 20201 era
solely on stealth.
It should be noted that one possible component
of the littoral threat arises from hundreds if not
thousands of small boats possibly carrying anti-
ship missiles, but more likely carrying direct fire
(unguided) anti-armor weapons or massed
explosives. Many of these boats may be
camouflaged (or in fact do double duty) as fish-
ing boats or coastal commerce craft. Pure chance
will bring one or more of these craft into near-
collision proximity with the combatants on a
regular basis. Shadowing or direction by long-
range surveillance assets will make such contact
a virtual certainty. No amount of radar signature
reduction, infrared signature reduction, acoustic
signature reduction, or even visual signature
reduction will protect a ship from recoilless rifle
fire or shoulder-launched antitank missiles fired
at point-blank range.
If the threat consists of large numbers of quiet
submarines or mines, the design for stealth will
similarly not provide the degree of survivability
desired. It is not hard to see that any submarine
equipped to detect other stealthy submarines
and operating at low speeds to minimize its own
noise will easily be able to detect surface ships
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regardless of the amount of acoustic stealth
achieved. Mine threats will also not be elimi-
nated by stealth. Given that the threat is likely to
use multiple-influence as well as contact fuzing,
mine clearance (detection, localization, and
neutralization) is the only defense that is likely to
succeed.
Design forActiveDefense
The second approach to survivability is to defeat
an engagement after it has been initiated. That
is, to incorporate active defenses to intercept and
destroy or degrade the ability of the threats to hit
the intended target. Historically, surface ships
have relied on layered defenses involving air-
craft, long-range missiles, short-range missiles,
guns, electronic jammers, and decoys. However,
a ship or a battle group can carry only a finite
number of missile kills in its inventory. At the
same time, the threat operating in its own terri-
tory is not severely limited in the number of
missiles it can fire.
A typical battle group in 2020 might consist of
an aircraft carrier (CVN), one AEGIS cruiser
(CG), two AEGIS destroyers (DDG), and three
new destroyers (DD-X class), although given the
planned reductions in the total number of ships,
this composition might be optimistic. Consider
the number of missile kills such a battle group
might possess. The aircraft carrier would have
an air wing of 60–80 aircraft. Of these aircraft,
no more than 36 would typically be assigned to
combat air patrol (CAP) missions. Of course, not
all of these aircraft would be flightworthy at the
same time. Perhaps 10% would be ‘‘down’’ for
maintenance. Although only a fraction of the
flightworthy aircraft will be airborne unless at
least a half hour of early warning is given, for the
purposes of this analysis, we will assume that all
flightworthy CAP aircraft have been sortied. We
further assume that each of the roughly 32 car-
rier aircraft available for CAP might be able to
intercept four missiles in a massive raid. Four
intercepts per aircraft are not the maximum
possible. However, air-to-air loadout is likely to
be six to eight AMRAAMmissiles depending on
whether the interceptor is an F-18 or a Joint
Strike Fighter. It is unlikely that every missile will
achieve a kill. It is also unlikely that an intercep-
tor aircraft will be able to find, chase down,
track, and attack more than four or five small,
high-speed missiles in the 4–6 minutes that it
takes the incoming missiles to close from a nom-
inal 300-km aircraft patrol outer envelope to
within the SM-2 missile range. Once SM-2 mis-
siles can be brought to bear on the threats, the
interceptors must break off the fight or risk be-
ing inadvertently shot down by our own
missiles. All factors considered, four intercepts
per aircraft are optimistic. Nevertheless, CAP
may account for as many as 128 missile kills. It is
just as conceivable that it will account for no
kills. If the attack is launched from short range
(within the SM-2 engagement range), CAP can-
not be brought to bear unless the SM-2s are not.
Among the surface combatants, there may be as
many as {128 (CG)196 (DDG)196 (DDG)1
128 (DD-X)1128 (DD-X)1128 DD-X)}5 704
VLS cells (Baker 1998). Two-thirds of the AEGIS
ship cells may contain SM-2 (214 total) and
1/8 of the DD-X cells may contain four-packs of
Sea Sparrow missiles (192 total) for air defense.
This is not an unreasonable loadout, given that
the AEGIS ships are primarily air dominance
ships and the DD-X are primarily land attack
ships. Many of the VLS cells must be devoted to
Tomahawk (land attack) and antisubmarine
warfare missions. If any of the ships has an exo-
atmospheric ballistic missile defense mission,
then even fewer VLS cells will be available to
carry SM-2s or Sea Sparrows. In addition to all
of the missiles, the battle group may have
(4121212121212)5 16 CIWS Gatling guns,
each good for roughly four kills each under ideal
conditions. A CIWS carries roughly 1,500
rounds of ammunition good for approximately
30 seconds of firing at the nominal 3,000 rounds
per minute rate. The maximum range of the
CIWS rounds is about 6,000m, with a quoted
effective of about 1,500m. Continuous firing at
an incoming subsonic missile over the range
from 2,500 to 500m (approximately 6.7 sec-
onds) will almost certainly (but not always)
result in a kill. Continued firing at targets closer
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than 500m will increase the hit probability, but
the probability of receiving serious damage from
missile debris rises rapidly as the destruction
range decreases below 500m. In any event,
CIWS is capable of only four complete 6.7 sec-
ond bursts before requiring reloading. Any
engagement for shorter times will have an
increased probability of miss. Thus, assigning
four kills per CIWS is optimistic.
The electronic warfare systems will contain a
mix of some systems with passive detection,
active jamming, and chaff/flare dispensers and
some systems without active jamming capability.
Systems with jamming will be somewhat more
effective against RF-guided missiles than systems
using only chaff. Both will have the same limited
effectiveness against IR-guided missiles. All
things considered, the EW systems may be
expected to negate roughly half of those missiles
that are not destroyed by the hard-kill defenses.
For this analysis, assume that the antimissile
missiles are 95% reliable and effective (histori-
cally, very good performance—many missiles do
not perform this well). Also assume that only
one missile is launched at each threat. Fleet-wide
integration of the Cooperative Engagement
Capability (Applied Physics Lab 1995) is
assumed to support optimal weapon allocation,
and so this is not unreasonable. Also assume that
the aircraft and CIWS systems are 100% effec-
tive at achieving their stated number of kills.
Given these weapons and assumptions, the
battle group is capable of achieving at most
1281{0.95  (2141192)}1645 578 hard kills
with soft kills on half of the remaining threat.
A potential adversary could buy 50,000 antiship
missiles over 20 years for the cost of one surface
combatant per year. The access denial study
(Melich et al. 2000) suggested that 1,000 mis-
siles per attack (o2% of a near peer
competitor’s probable inventory and perhaps
only 20% of a regional competitor’s inventory)
were not an unreasonably large expenditure
(oUS$500 million) for attacking (and almost
certainly destroying) a battle group worth more
than US$10 billion. In this instance, assuming
that only 80% of the launched threats func-
tioned properly, then 800 successfully launched
missiles would encounter 578 hard kills and 111
soft kills. Thus, 111 missiles would survive to hit
the seven ships of the battle group (16 hits per
ship). Essentially all of the available defensive
weapons are used up before the incoming raid
can be depleted of missiles. If each CIWS were
replaced by an 11-missile Sea-RAM launcher
(providing roughly 103 additional hard kills per
battle group), then 60 missiles would survive to
hit the seven ships (giving eight to nine hits per
ship). Even deployment of directed energy
weapons (which is decades away) is unlikely to
completely defeat such massive threats.
In the past, critics have argued that military
forces less sophisticated than ours lack the capa-
bility to coordinate time-on-target attacks with
large numbers of weapons. It is doubtful that
this remains true today, but the arguments above
make no reliance on temporal saturation. Even
with primitive command and control systems, all
threat elements could be coordinated to attack
within hours of each other. As long as the weap-
ons arrive at the target in a time frame that
precludes reloading the VLS cells, the analysis is
valid.
In practice, some degree of temporal saturation
of the defenses due to finite defensive engage-
ment rates and some degree of threat
coordination as well as the need to fire addi-
tional missiles at those threats that were missed
by the first shot would make the number of hits
even larger. Doubling the size of the defensive
suite would counter a 1,000-missile raid but
would also add enormously to the cost. Payload
costs would roughly double and each ship would
have to become substantially larger to handle the
increased number of missile launch cells. Of
course, even the doubled defense could be
defeated by 1,500-missile attacks. It will cost the
adversary far less to buy more missiles and
launchers/launch platforms than it will cost us to
put more defensive weaponry on each of our
ships, even if it were possible to put more defen-
sive weapons on those ships, which is doubtful.
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Even if the Navy was able to mount a task force
with all 12 of its carrier battle groups, a 10,000
missile attack is not beyond the capability of a
peer competitor and would deplete less than a
fifth of that competitor’s anticipated missile
inventory.
The trade between offensive weapon costs and
defensive weapon costs becomes even worse in
the littorals. If the Navy is close enough to bom-
bard targets on shore, weapons on shore are
close enough to bombard the Navy. In addition
to cruise missiles, land-based artillery (possibly
with imaging seekers on maneuverable projec-
tiles) (Gilreath et al. 1999; Lowther 1991),
aircraft (including civilian aircraft with impro-
vised armaments, armed drones, and
kamikazes—manned by martyrs or remotely
piloted), and small anti-armor weapons fired
from ‘‘noncombatant’’ vessels such as small fish-
ing boats must be considered. In short, designing
to survive solely by preventing hits from occur-
ring is a losing philosophy. Defensive weapons
should not be eliminated, but they cannot be
considered as the sole means of survivability.
The Navy currently lacks effective antitorpedo
weapons other than decoys. Some ships carry
mine hunting and mine clearing equipment, but
this equipment is of questionable adequacy in
addressing a major mine warfare threat. Even if
improved defensive weapons for the torpedo
threat and/or the mine threat become available,
their incorporation into ship designs will
increase costs and consume space, weight, and
power, unless resources allocated to air defense
are simultaneously reduced. Given the nature of
the missile threat, this is unlikely, although not
necessarily unwise.
Combining defensive weaponry with stealth is
also not adequate. Although stealth will make
many older weapons obsolete, if the adversary
opts to procure an entirely new suite of weapons
(with seekers guaranteed to counter the stealth
incorporated into our ship designs, because they
were designed after our ships were designed),
then stealth will not prevent the 1,0001 missile
attacks that make hit prevention a losing strat-
egy. The threat will clearly evolve based on our
own design choices, and in the course of a
40–50-year ship operational lifetime, several
generations of new weapons will be designed,
developed, and deployed. Because stealth and
defensive weapons cannot ensure ship surviv-
ability in the future environment, we must
consider designing to absorb and withstand the
effects of hits.
Design forPassiveDefense
We have already seen that reliance on stealth is a
costly and ultimately self-defeating strategy.
Sooner or later, weapons technology will over-
come the stealth and the ships will become
vulnerable. We have also seen that an enemy is
able to easily mass more offensive weapons
against any naval force than that force is possi-
bly capable of defeating with its defensive
weapons alone. Thus, neither avoiding attack
nor defeating an attack can be successful by
itself. The primary alternate strategy is to design
our ships to take multiple hits without sustaining
unacceptable levels of damage. The historical
importance of passive defense to survivability is
superbly demonstrated in Lillard’s recent review
of World War II aircraft carrier losses (Lillard
1999). Aircraft carriers with significant amounts
of armor protection not only survived more hits
but also took less time to return to full combat
capability after those hits than carriers designed
without significant armor protection.
Most current-generation antiship missiles have
relatively small warheads (typicallyo200kg of
explosive with only a few as large as 500 or
1,000 kg). Barring an uncontrolled fire, progres-
sive flooding, or sympathetic detonation of
stored munitions, the resulting damage should
be limited and the ship should be in little danger
of sinking. Blast and fire damage should be con-
fined to a few compartments, while shrapnel
damage should be limited to neighboring and
second neighboring compartments. Neverthe-
less, the ship is often rendered hors de combat by
damage to critical equipment or controls that
resided in the damaged compartments. For
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simplicity of expression, we will generally con-
sider all structural design details that act to resist
projectile penetration or absorb shock/blast
energy as ‘‘armor.’’ Thus, armor in various forms
and amounts can serve three major protective
functions: it can prevent penetration of the war-
head into a compartment; it can reduce the
transmission of explosive energy and explosion
products into adjacent compartments; and it can
limit the perforation of decks, partitions, and
bulkheads by shrapnel. With limited investment
in armor, one could at the very least contain
shrapnel damage to those compartments pene-
trated by a blast. With more armor, one could
contemplate limiting explosion and fire damage
to the single compartment penetrated by the
warhead.With thorough incorporation of armor
into a design, one could envision limiting explo-
sive warhead damage to exterior surface
deformation and scorching.
Armor has not been a dominant element in war-
ship design since World War II. The armor on a
battleship was designed to withstand the armor-
piercing projectiles fired by other battleships.
These projectiles were mostly hardened metal
cases filled with small amounts of explosives but
traveling at supersonic speeds. The 2,700-pound
16 in. projectile (Iowa class battleship guns),
fired with a muzzle velocity of 2,425 ft/s, con-
tained only 41 pounds of explosive D
(ammonium picrate) (Muir 1987). The armor
plate expected to be encountered prevented
higher explosive weight/total weight ratios.
Because ships were heavily armored against guns
during World War II, aircraft became the princi-
pal ship killers, capable of dropping bombs with
more penetrating power (through more lightly
armored decks) and considerably more explosive
content than a 16 in. projectile. As a result,
armor became less important than air defense
weapons. Because long-range aircraft are expen-
sive and an aircraft carrier can carry only a few
dozen strike aircraft, the number of aircraft that
an adversary could field to attack a fleet on the
open ocean was severely limited. In addition,
each aircraft could only deliver a limited number
of bombs and the accuracy of delivery often
depended inversely on the density of anti-aircraft
fire. It was therefore practical to consider shoot-
ing down enough aircraft (or unnerving their
pilots) to prevent even a single hit. This view has
continued to the present day. The transition to
missiles as the dominant threat did little to alter
this strategy as long as engagements were antic-
ipated to occur in blue water. This is not to say
that armor was not entirely neglected in the Cold
War years. Kevlar fiber armor was commonly
added to aluminum superstructure warships to
provide a minimum amount of protection
against shrapnel and small-caliber projectile
penetration (a quarter-inch aluminum plate pro-
vides very little ballistic protection compared
with a quarter-inch steel plate). However, few
designers considered preventing missiles from
penetrating at all.
In future littoral warfare we have seen that com-
batants will get hit by missiles. It makes sense to
resurrect the concept of ‘‘armor’’ as a necessary
component of ship design. During the last
50 years, the army has spent considerable
investment in improving armor. Using spaced
armor, composite armor (fiber-reinforced and/or
ceramic-based), special shaping, and even reac-
tive armor, it is possible to defend armored
vehicles against the worst anti-armor threats. It
is once again feasible to consider protecting
ships with armor. In a recent Capstone design
project in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Total
Ship Systems Engineering program, the student
team designed an arsenal ship (Baumann et al.
1997). To make the arsenal ship design afford-
able, the students opted for a modified repeat of
the T-AO 201 class of oilers. After incorporating
all the necessary combat systems, the ship still
had excess buoyancy. As ballast, it was decided
to fill the roughly 8 ft space between the double
hulls of the T-AO 201 design with alternating
6 in. thick layers of concrete and polymer hon-
eycomb material. Each 8-cell VLS unit was
independently enclosed in an additional 2.5 in.
of steel plate. Although detailed penetration cal-
culations were not performed, it is likely that the
external armor would completely absorb the en-
ergy released by an Exocet or Harpoon missile
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impact and explosion without rupture to the in-
ner hull. Should a rupture occur (perhaps caused
by one of the much larger antiship missiles with
1,000 kg or larger warheads), a high degree of
thick-walled compartmentalization assured that
the damage would be limited. The use of salvage
foam as a last-resort damage control mechanism
meant that neither fire nor flooding would
progress beyond the first affected compartment.
Furthermore, all critical equipment and spaces
were placed in deep interior compartments. The
superstructure was minimized in volume and all
critical functions were duplicated in remote
interior spaces. The armor around the launchers
precluded a detonation in one launcher from
causing sympathetic detonation in any other
launcher. A joking comment about this design
was that rather than the arsenal ship being a soft,
high-value target that needed protection by the
rest of the battle group (as feared by many), the
rest of the battle group could protect itself by
hiding behind the arsenal ship while it acted as
an unsinkable missile sump.
Although the arsenal ship project was not lim-
ited in displacement or stressed by high mobility
requirements as many future combatants will be,
it should be possible to include some of the same
passive protection design elements in all new
designs. Composite armors incorporating metal,
ceramic, fiber, and elastic layers with appropri-
ate tilts and spacing can provide the equivalent
of feet of rolled homogeneous steel armor in a
fraction of the thickness and an even smaller
fraction of the weight. Reductions in manpower
mandated by declining budgets mean that the
volume and weight formerly devoted to crew
berthing, consumables’ stowage, and other hab-
itability features can be used to permit increased
flexibility in compartmentalization and the
increased hull and bulkhead thickness required
by armor. For example, one new destroyer is
anticipated to have over 12,000 tons displace-
ment (full load) and a crew of 95. This should be
compared with 9,250 tons and a crew of 354 for
a DD-963 Spruance class destroyer (the values
for CG-47 Ticonderoga class cruisers and DDG-
51 Arleigh Burke class destroyers are within 5%
of the Spruance values). The increased displace-
ment and reduced crew should offer numerous
opportunities to add armor and improve
compartmentation practices. Any reduced de-
pendence on defensive weapons and or stealth
might also contribute weight, volume, and cost
margin for increased armor protection.
Armor is not the only passive defense measure
that might be used. The entire hull structure can
be designed to damp out whipping motions
induced by large explosions (from mines or tor-
pedoes) (Department of the Navy PMS-317
1999). Magazines and other appropriate spaces
can be fitted with flash suppression systems sim-
ilar to those on our armored vehicles (within
milliseconds of the armor being penetrated by a
weapon, the compartment is flooded with a fire
suppressant to minimize possibilities of second-
ary explosions). Magazines can be designed to
vent explosions away from crew compartments
and critical equipment spaces. Increased overall
structural strength can prevent complete struc-
tural failure, given damage to major structural
elements. With the advent of digital ships and
sophisticated sensors, critical control spaces
(such as the bridge or the pri-fly) do not need to
be placed in the most vulnerable areas (at the
outer skin of the ship). Vulnerable areas can be
used exclusively for noncombat purposes such as
berthing, messing, and recreation (it is assumed
that ships would be at general quarters during an
attack and therefore these spaces would be
unmanned) and thereby provide additional
‘‘spaced armor’’ protection to mission critical
spaces with no additional penalties. With mod-
ern sensor systems, threats can be tracked to
determine the precise location of hits before they
occur. Preemptive actions such as activating fire
suppression systems, shutting off electrical
power, and rerouting other utilities in the soon-
to-be-hit spaces can significantly reduce damage,
assist damage control, and speed recovery.
Widely separated redundant systems can be
incorporated for critical capabilities.
Ships incorporating these features may yield
added benefits. Damage sustained in collisions
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(with other ships or underwater obstacles) may
be reduced. Stronger, energy-absorbing super-
structure and hull designs can minimize shock
and gross structural motions that can sever
cabling and piping and throw loose equipment
around at considerable distances from the site of
the original explosion. Armor would also pro-
vide much-needed protection against the rapidly
escalating terrorist threat. No amount of defen-
sive weaponry or stealth will protect a ship that
is tied up to the pier with its defensive systems
inactivated. Small to medium direct-fire weap-
ons such as antitank missiles or indirect-fire
weapons such as mortars can inflict serious
damage on current combatants. Although rea-
sonable thicknesses of shipboard armor cannot
completely stop large, shaped-charge warheads,
they can limit the damage to a portion of the
single compartment that is ultimately pene-
trated. They may also be capable of completely
stopping smaller conventional mortar rounds
(with antipersonnel warheads) from doing more
than cosmetic damage. A large truck bomb det-
onated on a pier next to a conventional warship
could result in the obliteration of much of the
ship’s superstructure. Repair of such damage
would take months and could cost almost as
much as a new ship. Increased armor and the
resulting blast hardness would minimize the
damage such a bomb could cause, possibly lim-
iting that damage to masts and exposed sensors
and weapons.
Clearly, one cannot rely entirely on passive
defense for survivability. Enough ordnance
delivered against a concentrated target will
ultimately destroy it. However, we have already
seen that stealth and active defense cannot pro-
vide the survivability needed. Thus, future
combatants must combine the best in active
defense (incorporating directed energy weapons
at the earliest practical time—directed energy is
the only weapon with a virtually unlimited
number of kills, although the kill rate is still lim-
ited but high) with a significant level of stealth
(enough to force threat missile designers to use
more sophisticated and expensive seekers) and a
major amount of passive defense (enough
armor to completely negate the smaller antiship
missiles).
Design for Quantity
Referring to military hardware, Joseph Stalin
once said ‘‘Quantity has a quality all its own.’’
Although he was referring to the fact that large
numbers provide the ability to concentrate fire-
power against an enemy’s weak points, the
statement is also true in the defense. In the
1990s, with force transformation becoming a
necessity, the fourth survivability strategy of
increased numbers was investigated in a number
of projects. One of these, originally called ‘‘Street-
fighter,’’ involves replacing a small fleet of large,
high-capability ships with a large fleet of small,
modest-capability ships with fleet-integrated
capability equal in both cases (Hughes 1995). This
and other large-quantity ship concepts were
pursued under the auspices of the Naval Warfare
Development Command. These included the ‘‘Sea
Lance’’ access assurance craft (Harney 2001) and
the ‘‘Sea Archer’’ unmanned air vehicle aircraft
carrier (Calvano et al. 2002). Survivability comes
from large numbers, small size, and high
maneuverability. The threat will simply not be
able to target and hit them all.
A smaller size automatically reduces observabil-
ity, although this may not be a significant
contributor to survivability unless size reduction
is carried to extremes. High speed and high
maneuverability will also make a craft harder
to hit, although against supersonic, multi-g-
capable missiles with precision terminal seekers,
the extra speed and maneuverability that can be
achieved by smaller ships is not likely to have a
significant effect. However, increased numbers
can have at least two significant effects.
First, a single large ship may require multiple
hits (M) to be rendered ineffective, while a small
ship may require only one. However, N small
ships require a total of at least N hits to be ren-
dered completely ineffective. If N is significantly
larger than M, then survivability improves by
having many smaller ships. If the small ships can
survive one or more hits, the survivability
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margin of small ships over large ships becomes
even larger. Second, targeting is likely to have a
random element. It is unlikely that every missile
will be targeted in advance at a specific ship and
it is unlikely that the ships will be targeted uni-
formly. Doing so requires a degree of
coordination and real-time tracking knowledge
that is probably not achievable. As a result, with
a few large ships, some will be attacked by more
missiles than the average (which is likely to be
quite high) while some will be attacked by fewer
missiles. With many smaller ships, the average
number of missiles per ship will be significantly
reduced, but the variance may not be decreased
appreciably. Some ships will receive an over-
whelming concentration of missiles while others
may receive a few or none. Some ships will
almost certainly be lost, but some will almost
certainly survive.
Increased numbers may be even more effective
against the submarine threat and the mine
threat. Submarines will necessarily be available
in orders of magnitude smaller quantities than
missiles. Furthermore, submarines carry at most
a limited number of antiship weapons (i.e.,
potential kills). Mines may be deployed in large
numbers, but given the mobility of ships, mines
cannot be maneuvered or deployed for mass at-
tacks. The number of mines in any single transit
lane will be limited and possibly less than the
number of ships. Some ships will invariably
make it through any minefield.
Losses in combat that will invariably occur may
be made somewhat more palatable by reduced
manning. Essential life cycle cost reductions
will cause manning to be reduced to levels well
below the current standards. If a cultural change
were to make it acceptable to lose ships (if the
crews can be saved) in the same way that air
forces accept loss of aircraft, then manning
could be reduced to 10–20% of the current lev-
els. The elimination of personnel for damage
control makes this possible. In the extreme, the
increase in numbers could be obtained by
deployment of unmanned surface vehicles.
Loss of unmanned assets does not carry the
emotional baggage associated with the loss of
crewed ships.
It is generally accepted that one large ship is
cheaper than two smaller ships of comparable
aggregate capability. This has partially justified
the trend toward larger displacement ships that
has prevailed for the last century (if not longer).
However, a single large ship can only be in one
place at a time. Not all missions require the total
capability of the larger ship. Many could be per-
formed by the capabilities of a much smaller
ship. Several such ships could perform several
different geographically distributed missions at
the same time, while retaining the ability to per-
form the few major missions if brought together
in a task force. Once rendered inoperable or
sunk, the single large ship cannot perform any
missions—no capability remains. If one smaller
ship is sunk, the remainder can perform all of
their normal missions, and can still generate an
aggregate albeit somewhat reduced capability to
perform a more major mission. Given that a sin-
gle large ship will almost certainly be destroyed
in a massive engagement, the increased cost of
multiple smaller ships, some of which are likely
to survive, becomes a good investment.
Significantly reduced size does not mean loss of
capability. In the past, air defense and antisubma-
rine warfare have been performed by frigates and
corvettes. Naval fire support is performed with
surface-to-surface missiles and/or 5 in. guns and
these can be carried on small combatants. Even
naval aviation can operate from platforms as
small as 5,000 tons displacement. Conventional
take-off and landing aircraft cannot be accom-
modated, but short take-off vertical landing
(STO/VL) aircraft can. In the future, unmanned
air vehicles will likely take over more and more of
the missions currently performed by manned air-
craft. Thus, a significantly reduced size does not
mean loss of capability, but it will entail changing
the way we perform some missions.
Conclusions
The changing nature of the threat and the antic-
ipated changing nature of Navy missions will
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place naval combatants into conditions more
hostile than the Navy has seen since World War
II and quite different from those envisioned in
theMaritime Strategy. The threat will be capable
of using weapons in quantities and qualities that
can overwhelm defensive weapon systems.
Incorporation of stealth into ship designs will
not eliminate this eventuality, although it will
make it somewhat more expensive for the enemy
to field the overwhelming force. However, it will
almost certainly make our ships prohibitively
expensive to procure. Regardless, in full-scale
conflicts in the post-2020 time frame, naval
combatants can expect to be hit by antiship mis-
siles (and mines and torpedoes) in substantial
numbers. Ships designed to current survivability
practices with significant defensive weaponry
and stealth design will not survive. Future com-
batants must be designed to take multiple hits
(dozens) and not only survive but also be able to
continue to fight. We cannot afford to ignore
defensive weaponry and we must incorporate a
significant degree of stealth, but survival will
require designs that are resilient to hits. We must
resurrect armor concepts (in their most current
and innovative incarnations) and we must pay
more attention to functional redundancy, func-
tional location, and compartment design for
survivability. In the words of Admiral of the
Fleet Lord Chatfield (British CinC of the Atlan-
tic and Mediterranean Fleets, 1929–1932),
‘‘Ships are built to fight, and must be able to take
blows as well as to inflict them’’ (Brown 1991).
We should also consider building many smaller
ships rather than a few larger ships. At least
some of these should be unmanned. A balanced
approach between stealth, defensive weaponry,
passive defensive design, and more numerous
smaller platforms is needed if warships are to be
both survivable and affordable in the post-2020
time frame.
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